In the long run, he's still going to the stockade for a long time, because he DISOBEYED ORDERS. Doesn't matter if he took a stand based on his conscience or not; he very clearly DISOBEYED ORDERS given to him by superior officers, and that is why he will be convicted and serve time. 
 
That's just how the military works, BTW. You don't have to agree with your orders, but you do have to OBEY those orders.

Guest

Orders.

You are correct of course. 
I am an ex serviceman myself, and knew of people who would not work on aircraft that were going to attack people. The RAF had a neat trick, they would post them to a maintenance workshop, the RAF reasoned you maybe could brutalize them into complying, but could they trust them. If on the other hand you refused to wear the uniform, then yes it got very tough. 
I can see both sides of the story, pragmatism might have been a better approach by the military. 
I am sure many terrible acts carried out or directed by SS officers were just the obeying of orders. 
So here is the paradox, that Lt. Eric Watada sees the US invasion of Iraq constituting a war crime of waging a war of aggression. On the other hand the military see an officer disobeying orders. 
I think he has got guts. 
Also I think one has to go back to the The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, and really have a think. 
Personally I think they should have posted him to administration or the Antarctic, or any where, because now every body is watching and talking Worldwide.  
 
Mike

http://mozilla

Registered

Orders.

Orders, The world cannot be seen in only black and white issues. That excuse, "I was just following orders." did not work for those on trial at Nuremberg after WWII. Each person has to take responsibility for their actions and realize that they cannot hide behind excuses. Lt Ehren Watada realizes that and has declared that he will not participate in an illegal war and will not kill people just because he was ordered to. 
 
Even Bush started out framing the war as a black and white issue, "You are either with us, or against us." A few years later, he is asking all the other countries to send troups to help police Iraq. What happened to "with us or against us?" Russia was our ally in WWII and then the enemy for 40 years afterwards. Are they ally or enemy? Japan was an enemy during WWII and then an ally since. Are they enemy or ally? It is immature and simplistic to view the world that way and also to boil it down to "must follow orders."

Guest

Ehren's Right To A Double Jeopardy Clai

There are many facets to the Ehren Watada story, from start to finish. As someone sitting in the overflow room at his first court marshall in February, I assure everyone reading here, that trial was FULLY manipulated by Judge Head. 
Ehren had entered a plea accepted BY the court and the prosecution, he stipulated to FACT that he indeed missed movement but plead NOT GUILTY and was fully prepared that day, after ALL witness his defense had called had been dismissed by the judge-to present his Nuremburg defense. The JUDGE wanted the mistrial and asked Ehren to withdraw his stipulation of fact. Ehren REFUSED. The prosecution stated, 
"He thinks he has a defense, we don't" because in their minds the Nuremburg defense was bogus. 
Up til that point the prosecution had put on a better defense with their witnesses than Ehren could have ever hoped for, their case against Ehren was WEAK. But it was the JUDGE behind closed doors who got the prosecution to call a mistrial, something they ONLY did at the Judge's urging. Ehren was denied his own testimony. Ehren pleading not guilty was KNOWN and accepted by all parties, but the judge called the mistrial claiming EHREN didn't understand he had admitted guilt (missing movement) Ehren DID understand and there was NO reason to call that mistrial. Now the SAME judge has refused to recuse himself. The prosecution BLEW it in the first court marshal and that is why this judge is insistant on retrying Ehren. Only problem is, the law does not allow for the prosecution to retry because they blew it, or a judge to manipulate a trial. That is what this case is about at this point(NOT withstanding his HEROISM for standing UP) and Ehren's claim to double jeopardy IS legitimate.

http://thehollytree.blogspot.com/

Guest

Thanks.

Robin, 
These particular lines you wrote in your comment speak volumes. 
'Up till that point the prosecution had put on a better defense with their witnesses than Ehren could have ever hoped for, their case against Ehren was WEAK'. 
Like I said the World is watching, 
(Mainstream media may remain silent). 
Thanks for the info. 
 
Mike

http://mozilla

Registered

Patriot

Watada is one of the true Patriots of this entire shameful empisode. He didn\'t just follow his conscience, he followed the law - something this administration can\'t even fathom. The Lt.\'s case should be discussed in every classroom in America (and I have done so in a few). It is a history lesson derived from integrity and responsibility - not jingoistic propaganda emanating from a Commander In Chief who was too cowardly to ACTUALLY serve himself.

Guest

Bill Simpich review of trial

[Excepted] [It was the Judge that declared it a mistrial over the objections of Prosecution] 
 
The Watada Mistrial: Here's What Really Happened 
By Bill Simpich 
t r u t h o u t | Report 
 
Thursday 08 February 2007 
 
First Lt. Ehren Watada knew exactly what his case was about - and that scared the judge. 
 
There was absolutely no reason to stop the Watada trial. 
 
The judge's claim that Lt. Watada did not fully understand a document he signed admitting to elements of the charges is completely untrue (see Melanthia Mitchell, AP, 2/8/07). 
 
The military seized on that claim and complimented the judge for "protecting the rights of the accused" in granting the mistrial. 
 
Here's what really happened. 
 
Lt. Watada repeatedly told the judge on Monday and Tuesday morning, before the trial began, that he agreed with the 12-page "stipulation of facts" that was provided to the panel of seven officers as evidence of most of the key events in this case. The lieutenant reminded the judge in every response that he continued to believe that his orders to go to Iraq were illegal.  
 
I was there, with a roomful of media, military and civilian observers. We all saw the judge review the document at length and offer a number of suggested factual corrections. (Also see "Watada Lawyer: Double Jeopardy Will Be Argued If Second Trial Proceeds.") 
 
The judge also asked Lt. Watada if he felt "compelled" or "coerced" in his decision to not board the plane to Iraq. The lieutenant assured him that it was an intentional act and that his failure to board the plane was not due to any fear for his personal safety, while carefully reasserting his belief that he had no duty to obey an illegal order. 
 
The judge reminded him that he had already ruled that the order was legal. Lt. Watada responded that he understood what the judge was saying, and then repeated his belief once more. 
 
The stipulation specifically stated that Lt. Watada did not waive any legal defenses not addressed in the document. 
 
The purpose of this stipulation was to drop two charges against Lt. Watada (sparing him exposure to two additional years in prison) in exchange for a written agreement that most of the facts would be admitted into evidence, and thereby evaporate any purported reason for subpoenaing journalists to testify against the lieutenant at the trial.  
 
The document was prepared by the government. When construing a document, it is interpreted in favor of the person who did not prepare it. 
 
It was signed by all parties over a week ago. This was not a last-minute task. 
 
The judge was satisfied. The stipulation was accepted by the court and distributed to the panel Tuesday morning. 
 
The panel proceeded to hear the entire prosecution case on Tuesday: the 12-page written stipulation, two videos that were also part of the stipulation, and three prosecution witnesses that appeared to aid Lt. Watada's theory of the case. 
 
The judge raised concerns about the document on Wednesday morning, moments before Lt. Watada was set to take the witness stand. 
 
The judge had just received a new proposed legal instruction from Seitz. Since the judge had recently ruled that the order given to Lt. Watada to deploy to Iraq was "legal," Seitz took the logical next step. Entitled "Reasonable Mistake of Fact/Law," his new instruction was designed to inform the panel that even if Lt. Watada were "mistaken" in his belief that the order was illegal, a defense to the "missing movement" charge would be viable if the panel made a finding that Lt. Watada's belief that the order was illegal was "reasonable." 
 
Shaken by this instruction, the judge tried to claim that Seitz had introduced some error by submitting this instruction, forgetting that the panel had not seen the instruction and hence any error was literally impossible! 
 
Realizing the error of his ways, the judge then tried to speak to Lt. Watada about his understanding of the stipulation without asking Seitz for his permission. After initially warning the judge that he might not let him speak to Lt. Watada, Seitz relented and told the judge that he would let him speak to him over objection. 
 
The judge repeatedly tried to shake Lt. Watada's insistence that he reasonably believed that he was following an illegal order, all the while insisting that he wasn't trying to mislead him in any way. Lt. Watada again respectfully but firmly punctuated his remarks with his state of mind. 
 
Unsuccessful in his apparent effort to derail the defense, the judge then claimed that "I'm not seeing we have a meeting of the minds here," Head said. "And if there is not a meeting of the minds, there's not a contract." (Seattle Times) 
 
At this point, both the defense and the government figuratively "threw their arms around each other" and repeatedly told the judge that they wanted the trial to go forward. Courtroom observers agreed that they had never seen such a thing in their lives. 
 
The Seattle Times reported that "The defense and prosecution teams both believed the agreement did not constitute an admission of guilt. But the judge on Wednesday said the agreement included all the elements required to find Watada guilty. It was more than an agreement, Head said: It was what he termed a "confessional stipulation," with whatever reasons behind the action irrelevant to the question of guilt." 
 
Lt. Watada's attorney, Eric Seitz, said that the stipulation was not an admission of guilt. 
 
"No. Absolutely no way," he said. "Lt. Watada's a smart guy. He knew exactly what he was agreeing to." (Los Angeles Times) 
 
The judge turned to the prosecution and said "I can't unring that bell." But then, in what appeared to be a moment of panic, he suggested to the prosecution that they recall their witnesses. He warned them that he was considering issuing a mistrial. He offered to let them reopen their case if they wanted to. He offered them whatever time they needed to make a decision "thirty minutes, an hour, or more." When the prosecution assured the judge that they only needed thirty minutes, there was a disappointed look on his face. 
 
Apparently the defense was also asked if it would be willing to withdraw the stipulation and let the case proceed on that basis. As the panel had been relying on the stipulation throughout the prosecution case, the defense was not willing to do anything of the sort. 
 
Upon the prosecution's return, they asked for a mistrial. The defendant opposed it. The motion was granted, and a new trial date was set. But now there was a new problem that may make any new trial impossible. 
 
Once the trial commenced, "jeopardy attached." Once jeopardy attaches, a second trial is generally not possible. This is known as "double jeopardy." 
 
Like all maxims, there are exceptions to the rule of double jeopardy. For example, if a verdict cannot be reached by the finder of fact, defendant cannot object to the resulting mistrial. Nor can the defense create error in order to get the defendant off the hook. 
 
But a mistrial caused by judicial or prosecutorial error is another story. Generally, the charges must be dismissed in order to ensure that the authorities are not tempted to commit error in order to obtain a second trial when events are not going their way. 
 
This is what happened here. The prosecution knew that Lt. Watada was not waiving his right to defend himself against the charges. Again, the stipulation specifically stated that no such waiver was being made. 
 
The judge tried to make some mileage by reciting on the record a warning that he had previously given to Lt. Watada that by signing the stipulation, he was admitting that there was sufficient evidence on each element of the "missing movement" offense (for failing to board the plane to Iraq) for the panel to find him guilty. 
 
"Sufficient evidence," however, is a far cry from any kind of admission that there was no evidence to rebut the prosecution's evidence. It may be news to the judge that trials are conducted for defendants who have pleaded "not guilty," not for those who admit guilt. Was the judge considering what kind of trial he was suggesting? A trial where the determination of guilt or innocence by a panel of seven officers was literally meaningless? 
 
Let's close by examining the law on whether Lt. Watada can be forced to endure a second trial despite the double jeopardy doctrine. The latest case on the subject, US v. Eliot, 463 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2006), states: "When, as here, a mistrial is ordered over a defendant's objection, retrial is permitted only if there was a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial (a case-by-case determination with a "high" burden). Other factors to look at are whether the trial judge (1) heard the opinions of the parties about the propriety of the mistrial, (2) considered the alternatives to a mistrial and chose the alternative least harmful to a defendant's rights, (3) acted deliberately instead of abruptly, and (4) properly determined that the defendant would benefit from the declaration of mistrial." 
 
A case to look at for guidance is United States v. Rivera, 384 F.3d 49, 56 (3rd Cir. 2004) which states: "Critically, a mistrial must not be declared without prudent consideration of reasonable alternatives. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.3 requires that "efore ordering a mistrial, the court must give each defendant and the government an opportunity to comment on the propriety of the order, to state whether that party consents or objects, and to suggest alternatives. Where a District Court sua sponte declares a mistrial in haste, without carefully considering alternatives available to it, it cannot be said to be acting under a manifest necessity. Any subsequent reprosecution under those circumstances is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause." 
 
When you comment that you can't "unring a bell," and then ask the defendant to agree to withdraw a stipulation already seen by the finders of fact for an entire day, you have "consideration" about as "prudent" as a car crash. 
 
Eric Seitz has stated, "My professional opinion is that Lt. Watada cannot be tried again because of the effect of double jeopardy," and will file a motion to dismiss the entire case. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer has reported that John Junker, a University of Washington law professor, agrees that the granting of mistrial over the defendant's objection has opened the door to such a defense.  
 
"The notion is that you can't just stop in the middle and say, 'I don't like the way it's going' and start over," Junker said. "If the defendant objected, it does raise the possibility" of double jeopardy, Junker said. "That would happen in a civilian court, and I presume in a military court. That doctrine comes from the Constitution." 
 
Marjorie Cohn, a professor at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law and a proposed expert witness for the defense, opines: "When the Army judge declared a mistrial over defense objection in 1st Lt. Ehren Watada's court-martial, he probably didn't realize jeopardy attached. Although he faces the possibility of a dishonorable discharge, the judge's grant of a mistrial precludes retrial on the same criminal charges."  
 
Prominent Honolulu defense attorney Howard Luke states, "Was there manifest necessity? That's up to the court to decide...From what I understand, I think not. The case could have been continued."  
 
I wouldn't bet against these four authorities. Any fair-minded review of this case will reveal that the defense was doing far better than anyone had expected; that Lt. Watada had protected his rights at every turn; and that the judge was scared of letting this case go to any factfinder who had any chance of being fully informed of Lt. Watada's belief that the war in Iraq is illegal.  
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bill Simpich is an Oakland based Civil Rights attorney. He has defended Truthout on first amendment issues. He can be reached at billsimpich@yahoo.com.  
------- 
 
[B]nullnullboth the defense and the government

http://www.mrdowntownla.com

Guest

Tacoma Judge Issues Temporary Injunction

Judge temporarily blocks war objector's court-martial 
 
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 
 
TACOMA, Wash. -- A federal judge has temporarily blocked the Army from conducting a second court-martial of an Iraq war objector based at Fort Lewis, saying it's likely the second trial would violate the soldier's constitutional rights. 
 
Granting an emergency motion for a stay, U.S. District Judge Benjamin H. Settle ruled Thursday that no court martial will be held for 1st Lt. Ehren Watada pending the outcome of his claim that it would violate his Fifth Amendment rights by trying him twice for the same charges. 
 
Watada's first court-martial ended in a mistrial in February; Settle wrote that the military judge likely abused his discretion in declaring the mistrial. 
 
Watada is charged with missing his unit's deployment to Iraq in June 2006 and with conduct unbecoming an officer for denouncing President Bush and the war. If convicted, he could be sentenced to six years in prison and be dishonorably discharged. 
 
Watada contends the war is illegal and that he would be party to war crimes if he served in Iraq. The Army refused his request to be posted in Afghanistan or elsewhere. 
 
"This is an enormous victory, but it is not yet over," Kenneth Kagan, one of Watada's attorneys, said in a statement. 
 
Settle did not indicate what the next steps would be. 
 
Fort Lewis spokesman Joseph Piek said the judge acted "so that he may hear further evidence on the double jeopardy issue. 
 
"We look forward to the opportunity to file additional briefs to further explain to the District Court judge the full extent of the protections and safeguards" afforded under the military justice system at the trial court and appellate levels, Piek added in a statement. 
 
On Oct. 5, Settle ruled that his court had jurisdiction on the request for an emergency stay and that Watada's claim was "not frivolous." That ruling effectively blocked the scheduled Oct. 9 start of the second court-martial. The judge then asked for additional briefs, leading to Thursday's ruling. 
 
Watada's term of service in the military ended in December, but the legal proceedings have prevented his discharge. He lives in Olympia and continues to perform administrative duties at Fort Lewis, south of Seattle. 
 
Go to Thankyoult.org where you can read Ehren's attorney's take on what happened today and the 33 page ruling by Judge Settle. 
 
It is not QUITE over, but Judge Settle ruled PRECISELY as he should have, that Judge Head abused his discretion in the first court martial and that Ehren should NOT be tried again. 
 
THANK YOU EHREN, you are our HERO and may all that you have gone through come to you in blessings one thousand times and may your message ring LOUD for all to hear, REFUSE ILLEGAL WAR!

http://thehollytree.blogspot.com

Guest

Statement From Ehren's Attorney

Wednesday, November 14, 2007 
 
 
Federal judge ruled correctly on Watada court-martial injunction 
10:24 AM ET 
 
Kenneth S. Kagan [attorney for US Army 1st Lt. Ehren Watada]: "In February, 2007, 1LT Ehren Watada was tried by a court-martial for his refusal to deploy to Iraq, and for statements he made on four separate occasions in various media explaining his rationale for his intention to refuse to deploy (and on one occasion, explaining, after the fact, why he did not deploy with his unit). Prior to the commencement of his trial, 1LT Watada and the Government entered into a Pretrial Agreement and a Stipulation of Fact. Pursuant to that agreement, in exchange for his stipulating to the accuracy and authenticity of certain of the statements he made (thus relieving the Government of the burden of calling certain reluctant witnesses to establish a foundation for the admission of those statements), the Government agreed to move to dismiss two of the incidents (referred to as "specifications") of "Conduct Unbecoming an Officer." 
 
At the close of the Government's case, but before the defense presented its case, the presiding military judge, Lt. Col. John M. Head, announced that he was troubled by what appeared to him to be an inconsistent position taken by the defense (or at least, his sense of the position he believed the defense would be taking, as reflected by a proposed jury instruction relating to mistake of fact submitted by defense counsel). He thus thought that 1LT Watada acted in breach of the Pretrial Agreement, and indicated his intention to set it aside and reject the Stipulation of Fact. He undertook a lengthy colloquy with 1LT Watada, and engaged in a lively debate with counsel. What was most astonishing was the uniform approach taken by the defense and the prosecution, wherein both sides were in accord that there was no problem with the agreement, and no issue requiring a mistrial. The lead prosecutor went about as far as a lawyer can go in trying to dissuade the judge from declaring a mistrial, but, ultimately, after several hours, the prosecution caved in and reluctantly asked for a mistrial, which was granted over the defendant's vociferous objection. Defense counsel at that time, Eric Seitz of Hawaii, even warned the judge that the judge was creating a situation in which a second trial might well be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, but the judge was undeterred. 
 
My partner, Jim Lobsenz, and I took over as counsel for 1LT Watada in March, and sought relief in the military appeals courts (beginning with the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, and progressing to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). Our arguments were that (1) a second trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (2) a stay of further court-martial proceedings was required while the courts reviewed the double jeopardy issue. Notwithstanding our argument that double jeopardy relates directly to the "right not be tried," and that therefore the only way the Double Jeopardy Clause would have any meaning would be if arguable claims were reviewed before a subsequent trial, the military courts were unsympathetic, and insistent that 1LT Watada's rights could be vindicated on direct appeal (assuming a conviction, of course). 
 
At that stage, there was no alternative but to seek relief by way of a Sec. 2241 habeas petition and a request for an emergency hearing on a request for a stay. The matter was assigned to Judge Settle, who scheduled an emergency hearing the same day he received the case and our briefing. After hearing our presentation and the argument of the Assistant US Attorney, Judge Settle, the next day, issued an order staying the court-martial (which was scheduled to convene in 4 days) until further order. 
 
Next, Judge Settle asked for further briefing from the parties directed more specifically to the Double Jeopardy issue, and after receiving a full complement of briefing, took the matter under advisement. On November 8th, Judge Settle issued a 33 page decision, granting a Preliminary Injunction. In his order, Judge Settle found that Judge Head had abused his discretion in setting aside the Stipulation of Fact; that even if he had not abused his discretion, there was no "manifest necessity" for a mistrial; that 1LT Watada had demonstrated in several respects that there was a significant likelihood he would prevail on the merits of his Double Jeopardy claim; that he would be irreparably injured if he was forced to go to trial; and that the balance of harms (to him versus the public) weighed in his favor. 
 
In so ruling, Judge Settle did not stake out any new or novel grounds. His decision was not activist or legislative in scope. Instead, he relied upon well-settled precedent, long-established principles articulated in cases from the United States Supreme Court and numerous federal circuits. What distinguished our experience with Judge Settle from our experiences in the military courts was that Judge Settle took the issues seriously, and made an intellectually honest decision divorced from politics. Regrettably, we are unable say the same for the military courts. 
 
As of this writing, it is unclear what the next step(s) will be, with regard to our seeking an order converting the Preliminary Injunction into a Permanent Injunction, and the Army's efforts to seek a vacation of the Injunction and the right to try 1LT Watada a second time. It seems reasonably certain the Ninth Circuit will get involved at some point, and we remain confident that the law (without regard to the politics) is on our side." 
 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hotline/2007/11/federal-judge-ruled-correctly-on-watada.php

http://thehollytree.blogspot.com/

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