Supreme Court Checks and Balances in Boumediene
Jurist

After the Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited opinion, upholding habeas corpus rights for the Guantánamo detainees, I was invited to appear on The O'Reilly Factor with guest host Laura Ingraham. Although she is a lawyer and former law clerk for Justice Clarence Thomas, Ingraham has no use for our judicial branch of government, noting that the justices are "unelected."  Indeed, she advocated that Bush break the law and disregard the Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush:

The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 ruling that the Guantánamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus, and that the scheme for reviewing 'enemy combatant' designations under the Combatant Status Review Tribunals is an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus, a result I predicted in a December 3, 2007 article.

Guantánamo detainees have constitutional right to habeas corpus

Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution is known as the Suspension Clause. It reads, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." In section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Congress purported to strip habeas rights from the Guantánamo detainees by amending the habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)). In Boumediene, the Court held that section of the Act to be unconstitutional, declaring that the detainees still retained the constitutional right to habeas corpus.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reiterated the Court's finding in Rasul v. Bush that although Cuba retains technical sovereignty over Guantánamo, the United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control over its naval base and thus the Constitution protects the detainees there. Kennedy rejected "the necessary implication" of Bush's position that the political branches could "govern without legal restraint" by locating a U.S. military base in a country that retained formal sovereignty over the area. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts flippantly characterized Guantánamo as a "jurisdictionally quirky outpost."

Kennedy worried that the political branches could "have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will" which "would lead to a regime in which they, not this Court, say 'what the law is.'" "Even when the United States acts outside its borders," Kennedy wrote, "its powers are not 'absolute and unlimited' but are subject 'to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.'"

Thus, Kennedy observed, "the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers." Indeed, habeas corpus was one of the few individual rights the Founding Fathers wrote it into the original Constitution, years before they enacted the Bill of Rights.

"The test for determining the scope of [the habeas corpus] provision," Kennedy wrote, "must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain." It is such manipulation that Laura Ingraham would perpetuate. It was a Republican-controlled Congress, working hand-in-glove with Bush, that tried to strip habeas corpus rights from the Guantánamo detainees in the Military Commissions Act. The Supreme Court has determined that effort to be unconstitutional. Fulfilling its constitutional duty to check and balance the other two branches, the Court has carried out its mandate to interpret the Constitution and say "what the law is."

No adequate substitute for habeas corpus

Finding that the Guantánamo detainees retained the constitutional right to habeas corpus, the Court turned to the issue of whether there was an adequate substitute for habeas review. Bush established Combatant Status Review Tribunals ("CSRTs") to determine whether a detainee is an "enemy combatant." These kangaroo courts provide no right to counsel, only a "personal representative," who owes no duty of confidentiality to his client and often doesn't even advocate on behalf of the detainee; one even argued the government's case. The detainee doesn't have the right to see much of the evidence against him and is very limited in the evidence he can present.

The CSRTs have been criticized by military participants in the process. Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham, a veteran of U.S. intelligence, said they often relied on "generic" evidence and were set up to rubber-stamp the "enemy combatant" designation. When he sat as a judge in one of the tribunals, Abraham and the other two judges - a colonel and a major in the Air Force - "found the information presented to lack substance" and noted that statements presented as factual "lacked even the most fundamental earmarks of objectively credible evidence." After they determined there was "no factual basis" to conclude the detainee was an enemy combatant, the government pressured them to change their conclusion but they refused. Abraham was never assigned to another CSRT panel. It is widely believed that Abraham's affidavit about the shortcomings of the CSRT's in Boumediene's companion case caused the Supreme Court to reverse its denial of certiorari and agree to review Boumediene. This was the first time in 60 years the Court had so reversed itself.

While the Court declined to decide whether the CSRTs satisfied due process standards, it concluded that "even when all the parties involved in this process act with diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal's findings of fact." The Court then had to determine whether the procedure for judicial review of the CSRTs' "enemy combatant" designations constituted an adequate substitute for habeas corpus review.

"For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an effective and proper remedy in this context," Kennedy wrote, "the court that conducts the habeas proceeding must have the means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings. This includes some authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government's evidence against the detainee. It also must have the authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced during the earlier proceeding."

But in the Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA"), Congress limited district court review of the CSRT determinations to whether the CSRT complied with its own procedures. The district court had no authority to hear newly discovered evidence or make a finding that the detainee was improperly designated as an enemy combatant.

The Supreme Court noted that "when the judicial power to issue habeas corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer must have adequate authority to make a determination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order directing the prisoner's release." Since the DTA's scheme for reviewing determinations of the CSRTs did not afford this authority, the Court held it was not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus and thus section 7 of the Military Commissions Act acted as "an unconstitutional suspension of the writ."