After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, 22 Uyghurs were captured and delivered to the United States for incarceration at Guantanamo. Although some captives may have been innocents snared in the web of bounty hunters (five were released to Albania), most did confess to receiving training in firing AK-47 at the ETIM training camp at Tora Bora, according to a study of publicly available court documents by Long War Journal.

The Uyghur detainees’ advocates exploited the fact that the prosecution was unable to establish unambiguous links between ETIM and al-Qaeda or the Taliban, and argued that the young men be released as they had never shown any intention of committing terrorist attacks against the United States, the implication being that they sought military training solely for the purpose of the freedom struggle against the Chinese in Xinjiang. The Chinese were appalled that the Uyghur struggle might receive legitimacy and explicit or implicit international recognition, or those independent militants or their sympathizers might find a political haven somewhere.

Beijing has exerted considerable political pressure on the United States not to release 17 of the detainees into the custody of avowedly non-violent pro-independence Uyghur émigrés in the Washington DC area; it was also able to prevail on the Australian government in January 2009 to refuse to take any Guantanamo Uyghur detainees. The Chinese government has always been extremely aggressive in its efforts to ensure that Uyghur militants seeking independence do not find welcome anywhere, certainly not in Pakistan.

B. Raman, an Indian security expert wrote on the South Asia Analysis Group blog:

However, in 2007, the issues of Islamic radicalism, Uyghur separatists and Chinese interests collided catastrophically in the matter of the fundamentalist Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad. The mosque, avowedly pro-Taliban and linked to al-Qaeda, was a large and provocative bastion of fundamentalist Islamist power inside Pakistan’s capital and committed to the imposition of Sharia. Lal Masjid’s attempts to spread its reach through Islamic vigilantism met with the same ambiguous response from the Pakistan government as was later displayed in the inapt handling of the evolving crisis in FATA and NWFP.

Abduction of Chinese managers and employees of a massage parlor by the female members of a madrassa associated with the mosque as punishment for allegedly immoral activities, provoked the anger of the Chinese government and prompted a cautious, protracted siege of the mosque by the Pakistani army. Later, when declaring a state of emergency, Musharraf highlighted the Lal Masjid situation as the primary example of Pakistan’s problems with Islamist extremism:

The mosque’s leaders openly expressed their friendship towards China. Dawn reported: “We released [the hostages] in view of Pakistan-China friendship and after an assurance by the local administration that all such health clinics and massage centers, where “objectionable activities” are carried out, would be closed in Islamabad,” said Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the deputy chief of Lal Masjid.
 
Despite this, the Chinese government was still very upset that Uyghurs were connected with the mosque. They had accused the masseuses of being Chinese agents sent to spy on them to forestall disruption of the Beijing Summer Olympic Games by Xinjiang militants.
 
Aware of the weakness and instability of the Zardari government - and unhappy with its marked pro-US tilt - China appears to be reaching out to other players in the Taliban mess. A commentary in the People’s Daily on February 23 contained a clear statement of China’s desire that the threat of Islamic militancy be neutralized through concerted multi-lateral efforts than by US-led military campaign of extermination. It warned the Obama administration not to rely solely on a unilateral hard power surge to solve the Afghan problem, and urged the United States to stabilize Pakistan, conciliate Russia, and be realistic in defining acceptable outcomes for Afghanistan.

It should be noted that Chinese President Hu Jintao’s recent overseas trip included a high-profile visit to Saudi Arabia, which is mediating a deal that the Taliban repudiate al-Qaeda and enter the Kabul government. Closer home, the Chinese Communist Party hosted a delegation from Pakistan’s leading Islamic political party, the Jamaati-i-Islami (JI) in Beijing, Xi’an and Shanghai in February.

China was certainly pleased with JI’s unambiguous endorsement of China’s Xinjiang policy and the two parties signed a memorandum of understanding. The JI announced: “Both parties have agreed upon four principles including independence, equality, and mutual respect and not to interfere in the internal matters of each country ... Both sides assured full support to China’s national and geographical unity, and fully backed China’s stance on Taiwan, Tibet and Xin Jiang issues.”
 
Back in the NWFP, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, head of JI, heaped praise on China while skipping the embarrassing question of an alliance between an Islamic party and a godless communist state (like the one JI had conducted jihad against in Afghanistan).

The Pakistan Taliban are withdrawing traditional immunity to attack Chinese interests, the JI - whose brief from ISI excludes the Taliban, and whose modernist Islamic is far removed from the Taliban’s theological obscurantism - is not the right party for China for redressing the matter.

The significance of the agreement - and the involvement of “one senior intelligence official” - probably indicates that China anticipates a festering crisis in the Taliban-controlled Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and doesn’t expect the Zardari administration to be responsive or effective in helping China with its security issues. Therefore, instead of relying on Islamabad, Beijing is upgrading its direct contacts with the non-Taliban sections of Pakistan’s civilian polity, i.e. Islamist political parties, and intelligence apparatus.

NATO-SCO cooperation
 
Another interesting development is possible cooperation between SCO and NATO on Afghanistan. SCO conference on Afghanistan scheduled for March 27 in Moscow, a few days ahead of a similar United Nations meet in The Hague will focus on the "situation in Afghanistan and its influence on neighboring states, boosting joint efforts by the international community to counteract terrorism, the illegal drug trade and trans-border organized crime from Afghan territory". Russia, the current SCO president, has also invited the UN and NATO, with secretary general Japp de Hoop Scheffer likely to come to Moscow. Could this see the beginning of SCO-NATO cooperation on Afghanistan!

Due to their geographical proximity to Afghanistan and the threats of conflict spillover, the SCO members are naturally concerned about the security chaos in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is not far-fetched to anticipate a breakthrough over SCO-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan. This could begin despite lingering SCO suspicions of the Alliance’s operations much beyond the Atlantic Ocean in SCO’s backyard. But NATO's decision to put on hold the accession of Georgia and Ukraine is a positive sign.
 
In 2005, the SCO and Afghanistan had set up a Beijing based liaison group to deal with drug trafficking, cross-border crime and intelligence-sharing. But there was little progress. SCO still remains a loose organization with limited agenda and its members are not clear on its own future role. SCO secretary general, Bolat Nurgaliev, stated that "any physical involvement by the SCO in Afghanistan has not been contemplated so far". But worried about security in Xinjiang China appears to be in favor of a UN peacekeeping force for Afghanistan with troops from Muslim nations. Beijing might even provide troops, while Russia with memories of 1980s is not that keen.  In UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the idea of sending blue helmets to guard Afghanistan's porous borders is under serious consideration.

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