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Capturing or Killing Bin Laden  In a January 2009 CBS television interview, Obama suggested that he's dead by saying "whether he is technically alive or not, he is so pinned down that he cannot function. My preference (is) to capture of kill him. But if we have so tightened the noose that he's in a cave somewhere and can't even communicate with his operatives, then we will meet our goal of protecting America." Nonetheless, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs responded to the latest purported bin Laden statement that it's "consistent with messages we've seen in the past from al Qaeda threatening the US and other countries that are involved in counterterrorism efforts." So it's no surprise that top administration orders reach field commanders like McChrystal to capture or kill the usual suspects. From known reports about him, he carries them out with relish. The Obama administration gave him carte blanche authority to choose his staff for their assigned mission - expand the Af-Pak war with more troops, funding, stepped up counterinsurgency, targeted killings, and secret drone and other attacks against any targets he chooses in either country. He'll also have more political control, possibly with a Washington-appointed civilian authority to run the Afghanistan government day to day, making Hamid Karzai more of a figurehead than currently. Obama's war aims to pacify the country and Afghan/Pakistan border areas through scorched earth terror, targeted assassinations, and as much mass killing as it takes to prevail. McChrystal has the job, a man one observer said "comes from a world where killing by any means is the norm and a blanket of government secrecy provides the necessary protection." All the greater with Obama's endorsement. Former 82nd Airborne Division commander General David Rodriquez, Defense Secretary Gates' top military aide, will be his deputy. Gates praised McChrystal for his "unique skill set in counterinsurgency" and said the mission of both men and their team "requires new thinking and new approaches by our military leaders." Clearly implied are the Special Ops skills they possess in what an unnamed Defense Department official called "unconventional warfare....to track and kill insurgents." These tactics kill many hundreds, displace hundreds of thousands, and enrage civilians on both sides of the Af-Pak border. Yet pursuing them is Obama's top war strategy priority that may include Iraq as violence there heats up. Operation Phoenix From 1968 - 1973, the CIA ran or was involved in the Phoenix Program with US Special Forces and its own Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Special Operations Group (MACV-SOG) involving covert missions to crush the National Liberation Front (NLF resistance called the Viet Cong or VC). One person involved called the operation a "depersonalized murder program" to remove opposition and terrorize the population into submission. In 1975, Counterspy magazine said it was "the most indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since the Nazi death camps of world war two." It even targeted certain US military personnel considered security risks and members of the South Vietnamese government. In simple terms, the program conducted mass killings and seizures of suspected NLF members and collaborators with special emphasis on high-value targets - by some estimates around 80,000 or more before it ended. Wayne Cooper was a Foreign Service officer at the time. He spent 18 months in Vietnam, most of it as a Phoenix advisor at Cantho in the Mekong Delta. He called the operation a "disreputable, CIA-inspired effort, often deplored as a bloody-handed assassination program (and) a failure." In the mid-1960s, it began as a CIA "Counter Terror (CT) program "never recognized by the South Vietnamese government." It "recruited, organized, supplied and directly paid CT teams whose function was to use Vietcong techniques, kidnappings and intimidation - against the Vietcong leadership." By 1968, the program was expanded and called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX), then Phoenix. From General William Westmoreland and "Ambassador-for-pacification Robert Komer" on down, "neutralizing" the VC was top priority. Westmoreland took charge. A Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) organization was established, under which Phoenix was run. Cooper cited numerous problems for its failure and criticized experts sifting through them to get it right next time. He called the program a "gimmick" unable to "compensate for South Vietnam's" popular opposition to the war and concluded that no counterinsurgency can succeed under those circumstances. Certainly not in Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries historically opposed to foreign occupations with a record of brave resistance to end them. They represent what the CIA called Vietnam during that earlier era - "the grand illusion of the American cause;" the latest Washington misadventures no matter how long they go on, whatever amounts are spent on them, or how much mass killing and destruction persist under any command. America hasn't won a war (or fought a legal one) since WW II, something Obama might consider as he plans his next move.
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 Stephen Lendman, a contributing editor to MWC News, is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization. He lives in Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen[at]sbcglobal.net.
Also listen to The Global Research News Hour on RepublicBroadcasting.org Monday through Friday at 10AM US Central time for cutting-edge discussions with distinguished guests on world and national issues. All programs are archived for easy listening. other articles by this author: http://mwcnews.net/StephenLendman |
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