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Society + Culture, Behavioral Fascism by James L. Secor Over the past few years, there have been attempts to compare George W. Bush to Adolph Hitler with varying degrees of power and success. Following along with William L. Shirer's Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and seeing the parallels is quite illuminating but the focus is somewhat misplaced. Fascism does not reside in one individual, certainly not George W. Bush whose charisma could not have curried the favor of so many Americans all by itself. Fascism is a way of perceiving the world; this worldview dictates behavior. It is by way of this behavior that fascism might best be appreciated. This is especially so in a fascist's or a fascist country's dealing with the rest of the world, what is known as foreign policy. In America, for example, this can be seen quite clearly in the military policies, the military (and political) decisions made in Iraq.
In 1941, Nazi General Albert Kesselring was made Commander-in-chief of the South, which included the North African campaign and, later, the Sicilian and Italian theatres where he was given the rank of General Field Marshal. It was in the Italian campaign that Kesselring came into his own by conducting a brilliant defense of the peninsula. But his noteworthy military and strategist career was marred by his involvement in the Ardeantine cave massacre of March 1944 in which 335 Italian partisans were shot, at least 255 of whom are civilians, in response to the killing of 35 German soldiers partisans had trapped and bombed. It is perhaps noteworthy, if we take George W. Bush's estimates as truth, that ten times the payment was dished out by Kesselring, as Mr. Bush seems to have done with the vengeance for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. But this is of little consequence in the larger picture. During 1944, Kesselring issued a directive concerning the military and its dealings with the partisans. It must be noted that at this time, Italy had capitulated and Germany was waging the war. Italy was a kind of occupied territory, held captive by its Ally. It is this directive that gives a clear view of fascist behavior, the most noteworthy facet of which is intolerance of any different point of view. It is here, in this directive, that we can see the parallel fascist behavior in America's Iraqi foreign policy. This directive reads: Following the well-known appeal directed by Field Marshall Kesselring to the Italians, the same Field Marshal has now imparted to his own troops the following orders: 1. Initiate the most vigorous action against the armed bands of rebels, against the saboteurs and criminals who by their deleterious conduct in any way hinder the prosecution of the war or disturb order and public safety. 2. Establish a percentage of hostages in those locations where armed bands continue to exist and execute said hostages each time an act of sabotage occurs in those localities. 3. Undertake acts of reprisal, including the burning of dwellings located in areas from which gunshots have been fired against German military individuals or units. 4. Hang in public piazzas those elements held responsible for homicides, and the leaders of armed bands. 5. Hold responsible the inhabitants of those towns where the interruption of telegraphic or telephonic lines occur, as well as sabotage related to traffic flow (scattering of broken glass, nails, or other materials on road surfaces, damaging of bridges, obstruction of roads).  Field Marshal Kesselring Although perhaps execution of hostages--prisoners--does not occur with each new act of rebellion by the Iraqis and given that there are no public executions, it seems to me that there is a parallel modus operandi in the American military's dealings with Iraq. This can be further seen if it is realized that the parallels to South Korea are more applicable than the usual comparison with Vietnam, where perhaps #2 and #4 of Kesselring's directive did hold true. In Japan Diary, Mark Gayn makes it perfectly clear that South Korea was an occupied country, for it was part of the Japanese Empire. People believed, though, that Korea was a liberated country, whereas the military thought differently. With the same disdain for the State Department as exhibited by the Department of Defense in Iraq, U.S. right wing collaborators were brought in to counter the fear of Communism; in Iraq, that is of Islam. As with Kesselring, American policy drove legitimate organizations underground, labeling them rebels; in Iraq , as in Korea, these people were called insurgents, thus opening the way to military justice: kill or be killed intolerance. Fascism. As with Korea, Iraq is "a conspiracy of insufferable corruption." So, too, German fascism. One only has to look to the electoral gerrymandering and the power politics and indictments within the Houses of Congress to see the same in America. Evidence has surfaced recently of Kesselring-like behavior during the Korean Conflict which only adds to the efficacy of a parallelism with Iraq. In both the German Reich and the American Republic, the populace gave their tacit approval of these activities if by no other manner than not protesting. Both were fed thin propaganda, a veil of rhetorical rationalism. We know that fascism fueled Germany's run for world domination; that military foreign policy is essentially the same in America's dealings with Iraq, it would seem that America is a purveyor of fascist policy via behavior. As with Japan's resurrection of samurai codes of conduct (honor) and the godliness of Emperor and Nation--superiority-- America has resurrected Manifest Destiny. If more evidence is needed, perhaps reading Wilhelm Reich's The Mass Psychology of Fascism, Ernst Cassirer's The Myth of the State and Jacques Ellul's Propaganda will dispel doubts as to the fascism that fuels America--not a particular person or a particular group of people, the entire country because the people follow along or, as Karl Jaspers noted in his A Question of German Guilt, the people are just as guilty as the country's leaders, for they could have stopped this behavior. He included himself, for no one is totally innocent. The rise of protests against American policy in Iraq--much less just being there--speaks to the disgust many feel concerning such behavior. That many of these protestors are military or former military, including those who have served their tour of duty in Iraq, makes this disgust even more eloquent. As with Korea, as with Vietnam, there is no thought given to withdrawal and no ability of admitting mistakes (and righting them). Only by confronting our behavior can we hope to rid ourselves of the fascist mentality of intolerance that has laid its heavy hand over the country. Behavior explicates thought; thinking comes before action. It is America's outward behavior rather than how it feels or looks to its citizens on the inside that shouts fascism. Fascism arises when fear is the overriding raison d'tre of thought, when "fear of" is the going worldview. ====================== Jimsecor is a freelance writer who has travelled extensively overseas, especially Japan and China. He has published in all genre and produced several plays over the years and has taught theatre, writing and literature.
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