The second is the declining power of the Congress to authorize the use of military force. A recent bipartisan commission recommends that Congress should replace the War Powers Resolution with legislation that fairly acknowledges the president's defensive war powers, omits any arbitrary general time limit on deployments of force, reaffirms the constitutionally-derived clear statement rule for use-of-force bills, and prescribes rules for their privileged and expedited consideration. 9

The third is the erosion of democratic accountability by the growing privatization and outsourcing of military operations. The risk of the widespread and expanding reliance on private military forces is that they allow governments to carry out actions that would not otherwise be possible, legal, or gain legislative or public approval. They do allow governments to meet unrecognized or unpopular strategic needs. But they also disconnect the public from foreign policy and remove actions from popular oversight. Contractor casualties and kidnappings are not listed on public rolls and are rarely mentioned by the media. Contracts for private military firms are also not subject to Freedom of Information Act requests.

Some Animating Questions on Military Power and Democracy

Is there an increased reliance on the military and military power as the currency of choice for foreign policy? What are the costs and benefits?

Is the current framework for congressional-executive relations able to provide both accountability and effective deployment of military force to meet real threats?

What is the most effective mechanism for insuring democratic control over the use of military force?

Does the need to combat terrorism require a reduction of Congress' historical role (if unevenly exercised) as the body entrusted with declaring war or authorizing the use of military force?

Is there a difference between declaring war and the use of force in the kind of surgical operations outlined by the Pentagon's new military plan?

Has the War Powers Act failed to serve as an effective mechanism for checks and balances on the deployment of military forces? Has the Congress defaulted from its role in authorizing force and what kind of institutional or other reforms would be appropriate to have it play a more effective role?

What is the net impact on U.S. democratic values and institutions of the growing reliance on private military firms?

C. Economic Policy, Inequality, and Democracy

A key aspect of the connection between democracy and foreign policy is economics. Who influences foreign policy outcomes? Do economic inequalities matter?

The prevailing wisdom is that the groups that influence foreign policy are, in order of impact, internationally-oriented business groups, experts, labor, and the general public. 10 A recent study suggests that:

• Business influence is fairly large and influential across institutional groups of policymakers (especially executive branch and Senate officials) and issue areas;
• Experts also have an important influential role, although the scope of their impact is contested.
• Labor leaders appear to exert a consistent (if secondary) influence on policy makers, especially on members of the House of Representatives and especially on economic issues.
• Mass public opinion, when controlled for the influence of organized interest groups, has relatively little effect on policymakers with the partial exceptions of House members and in economic policy.

Increasingly unequal participation in democratic politics is another dimension. Inequality has deepened since the 1970s, not only in terms of voting but in other forms of civic and political engagement. 11 The impact of globalization appears to have reduced the role and influence of organized labor. And free trade agreements tend to enhance the power of international organizations or dispute resolution mechanisms (i.e., the WTO, NAFTA) against the regulatory power (often framed as the popular or national sovereignty) of U.S. federal, state, and local governments.

The extent to which foreign economic policy (whether free trade, globalization, or protectionism) worsens inequality (even if it raises overall welfare), the worse it is for the quality of democratic representation.

Some Animating Questions on Democracy and Foreign Economic Policy

Analysts argue that globalization, national sovereignty, and democracy in their full-blown senses are not compatible; you can only have two. If so, which is better to match with democracy: globalization or national sovereignty?

Is the issue of inequality and democracy really more an issue of domestic rather than foreign economic policy? What policies would have the most immediate effect?

Is there an effective alternative to Trade Promotion Authority (Fast Track) for congressional involvement in trade policy?

D. International Law, Global Governance, Foreign Policy, and Democracy

The relationship between international law, global governance, foreign policy, and democracy is a new arena of debate. Many see the expansion of global governance, international law, and human rights as positive for democracy at home and abroad. Some wish to constrain the U.S. government's authority by embedding it more deeply in the architecture of international law at the same time that they are skeptical of embracing international economic organizations like the WTO and bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements. A prime example is the disagreement over U.S. membership in the International Criminal Court.

Others see international agreements and the mechanisms of global governance as serious constraints on the exercise of U.S. power unless they can be clearly demonstrated to serve immediate American interests. They are concerned that the internationalization of decision-making undermines the U.S. Constitution and creates new constraints on the exercise of U.S. sovereignty.

III. Democratizing Foreign Policy

So what are the implications for those aspiring to influence the course and conduct of U.S. foreign policy? What are the best avenues for democratic participation in the making of foreign policy? Would a more democratic foreign policy be a better foreign policy?

These questions can be approached in two ways. One is to focus on the ends of foreign policy. In this vein a democratic foreign policy is one that reflects democratic values. Minimally, this means respect for civil liberties and democratic institutions at home and abroad. More expansively, it means active promotion of democracy abroad through means including the use of force. A second approach is to focus on the process of formulating foreign policy, one that is more participatory, including a more active role for both elected officials (particularly legislative officials) as well as mechanisms for including the views of citizen groups. We will focus on the latter.

Existing Pathways

What are existing mechanisms for democratic participation in the making of foreign policy? Elections are the clearest forms of citizen participation, but there are other institutionalized mechanisms. Much of the debate over Iraq policy has really involved issues of accountability, and in particular, the exercise (or lack thereof) of checks and balances by the legislature and the judiciary on the executive.

The Congress

The Congress has varied greatly in terms of its assertiveness as a foreign policy actor. It perennially plays a principal role on issues such as trade policy, economic sanctions, placing conditions on, or explicitly earmarking foreign aid. In recent years it has become more assertive with respect to the executive branch on issues such as civil liberties, torture, and debates over the use of force.

In the trade area, congressional leaders could play a more active role upstream in the negotiating process. For example, Tokyo Round negotiators claim that there was far more involvement of congressional staff in those talks—especially the presence of congressional staff in Geneva for informal consultation—than existed during the Uruguay Round or subsequent rounds.

Strengthening Congress involves strengthening the role of relatively impartial policy analysts in providing congressional staff with the necessary information. One possibility is to expand the Congressional Budget Office's role, either by expanding it or creating a new office, to deal with trade and other foreign policy issues. The Congress used to have an Office of Technology Assessment which provided an important independent source of information on a range of issues, some of which related to foreign policy. A more grandiose proposal on trade issues would be to create a Congressional Trade Office which could also coordinate a more effective process of oversight on issues relating to regulatory harmonization. 12

Trade Promotion Authority was originally developed to sidestep the rent seeking that Congress would invariably be drawn to in considering trade and investment legislation. However, this has now become an obstacle to effective deliberation on trade issues. 13 New mechanisms for enabling Congress to play a stronger role on trade and investment policy are needed.

The Courts

Although the judiciary is routinely deferential to the executive branch in terms of the content of U.S. foreign policy, it has been more assertive than Congress in identifying the outer limits of the executive branch's ability to weaken democratic and civil liberties protections. This has involved everything from denial of due process to “unlawful combatant” detainees, as well as the basic labor rights of employees of the Department of Homeland Security. The courts play other roles in terms of giving citizens a direct role through provisions such as the Alien Tort Claims Acts and legislation that enables victims of terrorist attacks to sue perpetrators, conspirators, or state sponsors of such acts.

Executive Branch

Outside of the top two elected officials, the most common forms of citizen participation involve lobbying and participation on advisory committees and various boards such as the Defense Policy Board. These bodies rarely offer a broad spectrum of views. For example, USTR Advisory Committees are required by law to represent a fair balance of views. To take one example, however, seven out of 15 members of the Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property represent the pharmaceutical industry, while there are no representatives from public health experts or consumers of prescription drugs. As of August 2005, the pharmaceutical industry held 20 seats on 8 committees, and representatives of public health organizations hold none. 14

As a result of these shortcomings, as Susan Aaronson points out in Redefining the Terms of Trade Policymaking, trade officials have fumbled the opportunity to “use the advisory system to build a broader public constituency in support of economic internationalism.” 15

States, Federalism, Democracy, and Foreign Policy

State and local government involvement in “foreign policy” is not new. In the 1960s, states occasionally forbade government purchases from communist countries or required that most state materials be bought domestically. In the 1980s, some cities declared themselves “nuclear-free zones” and some cities and states enacted divestment measures against apartheid South Africa. Again, although the constitutionality of such ordinances was questioned, few court challenges were brought.