Special Features,

The Pentagon Counter Attacks

The Pentagon issued a memorandum to civilian military analysts and former top military commanders to challenge the criticism. "US senior military leaders are involved to an unprecedented degree in every decision-making process," it said, noting that Rumsfeld had held 139 meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 2005.

Among the top guns fielded before the media, were Gen. Tommy R. Franks of the Army, who commanded U.S. troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and Gen. Richard B. Myers of the Air Force, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until six months ago. So far, no high-ranking officers from the Air Force have spoken out against Rumsfeld, who promotes "force transformation" and air power, except for retired air force Major-General Don Shepperd, who said the Pentagon had made "some severe mistakes" in Iraq.

Rumsfeld himself went before the cameras to defend himself in what the New York Times derisively referred to as "the Donny show" and "a daily ritual." Almost every day, Bush has found it necessary to repeat his statements of support for Rumsfeld.

Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Mike DeLong rejected the idea that new leadership was needed at the Pentagon. "Dealing with Secretary Rumsfeld is like dealing with a CEO," he told CNN. "When you walk in to him, you've got to be prepared. You have to know what you are talking about. If you don't, you're summarily dismissed. But that's the way it is, and he's effective." {In fact that was the criticism against US war in Vietnam .It was a treated as management problem. What you need in war is overall leadership and not the qualities of a CEO e.g., of Enron.]

White House spokesman McClellan said, "We are a nation at war and we are a nation that is going through a military transformation. Those are issues that tend to generate debate and disagreement and we recognize that."

A Pentagon spokesman, Eric Ruff, described the accusations and differences among generals as more evidence that dissent was unwelcome. "That comment reflects the kind of candor and straightforward approach that General Myers followed when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs." On the debate over troop levels, Ruff said combat commanders and the Pentagon's senior uniformed leadership devised the war plan before sending it to Rumsfeld and his civilian aides for approval, disputing the notion that Rumsfeld was making top-down decisions.

Rumsfeld remains enamored of missile defense and precision weapons. He is skeptical of the Army leadership, which he considers old-fashioned, wedded to heavy forces and slow to change. His supporters considered General Myers and his successor, Gen. Peter Pace of the Marine Corps, helpful in overcoming deeply entrenched institutional resistance to transformation

Controversy among Generals

Former Army chief of staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki,(L)

A major point of controversy concerns the testimony before the Congress in February 2003 by the former Army chief of staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, with experience as Nato Peacekeeping Forces Commander in Bosnia .He said that peacekeeping operations in Iraq could require several hundred thousand troops, because of "the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems." Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld's deputy, described the estimate "wildly off the mark," and was supported by the latter. Wolfowitz also told the Congress that a smaller force than what General Shinseki estimated would do because the Iraqis would welcome the Americans, and that unlike Bosnia, Iraq had no history of ethnic strife. Gen Shinseki was then retired. Thomas E. White, the Army secretary, who supported Gen Shinseki, was fired by Mr. Rumsfeld soon after Baghdad fell.

General Franks had initially proposed a force of up to 385,000 troops. That number shrank as the war plan morphed from a version called the Generated Start, to the Running Start, to the Hybrid, to Cobra II. Newt Gingrich, the former House speaker who was an adviser to Rumsfeld, described the discussions between General Franks and the defense secretary as one of "constant negotiation."

[In my piece dated 17 February 2003 in www. Saag .com titled 'Iraqi Mosaic in Pandora's Box', I had written, "   Iraq is a delicate mosaic, which must be handled carefully, but a US led war would shatter and scatter it to bits. Whenever post Saddam Hussein Iraq is discussed in USA and elsewhere, not enough serious thought is given to ethnic, religious and other differences of its constituents and their tortuous history, which go to make Iraq a delicate mosaic."]

An arrogant man ,Wolfowitz ,soon after the speedy fall of Baghdad ( a natural outcome of a war between US with annual defense spend of $ 400 billions and Iraq a few billions respectively ) , visited Ankara and lambasted the Turkish leadership , including the military brass for not joining in the US invasion , when the Turkish Parliament, with over 90% of country's population vociferously opposed to the US attack on a friendly Muslim neighbor , had rejected the government motion to let US troops use Turkish territory in South East to open a second front against Iraq. However, Turkish leaders gave him back as good and publicly rebuked Wolfowitz. Relations between NATO allies US and Turkey, a major player in the region, have worsened. Rumsfeld had even said UK need not join when there was some confusion , but British Prime Minister Tony Blair would not give up pillion riding for glory and some gains .There appears little in this misadventure. 

Wolfowitz, described the estimate 'wildly off the mark'

But then look at the intemperate language used by US Congress men or the US Ambassador  in New Delhi on the question of India's vote on Iran in International Atomic Energy Agency , Vienna or India's energy security needs. Secretary of State Condi Rice goes around the world hectoring every one in sight. Such displays of US arrogance have alienated many friends around the world at time when US is deep in trouble and indebted to the world by over US$ 8 trillions.

Not so civil war of words among US generals

General Myers, appointed by Rumsfeld in 2001, has been hitting back at the generals critical of Rumsfeld as a breach of military etiquette. Quite obviously, Gen Myers does not share the grave concern at the situation in Iraq for which he as the senior most professional adviser is responsible for the planning and the conduct of the war and must share the maximum blame.

On the controversy over peacekeeping requirements, General Myers told ABC, "He [Gen. Shinseki] was inappropriately criticized, I believe, for speaking out," but otherwise supported Rumsfeld.

Wolfowitz told the Congress that a smaller force than what General Shinseki estimated would do because the Iraqis would welcome the Americans

When asked on ABC whether he thought, "it was a mistake not to follow the guidance of General Shinseki," General Myers that he did not.

"The judgment we got from academia, from anybody that wanted to make inputs, to include the National Security Council, was that we had the right number of troops," said General Myers, He  also disputed accusations that he was intimidated by Rumsfeld. [However, he is certainly trying to intimidate his senior commanders even in retirement]

In the current issue of Newsweek, General Shinseki, said in reply that he should have made a more aggressive case for more troops, adding; "Probably that's fair. Not my style." It sums up the atmosphere at the Pentagon that instead of cool arguments and assessment, aggressive positions like those of Wolfowitz, his boss and Gen Myers guided the final decisions and not the merits of the presentation.

Public rebuking of General Shinseki by the civilian pentagon's leadership still rankles military colleagues, especially as the Pentagon leadership was wrong. And it goes to the heart of the criticism with Rumsfeld and his top aides disregarding calls for more troops before the invasion