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Apr 27 2006
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By kgajendra singh   
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The Generals' Revolt (Part III)
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Special Features,

  • The Generals' Revolt 
  • The Generals' Revolt (Part II)

    Richard` Holbrooke on the revolt

    Writing in the Washington Post, Richard Holbrook, a former US ambassador to the United Nations, and a front runner to be the secretary of state if Florida votes had been counted properly, said that the calls by a number of recently retired generals for the resignation of Rumsfeld " have created the most serious public confrontation between the military and an administration since President Harry S. Truman fired Gen. Douglas Macarthur in 1951.

    In that epic drama, Truman was unquestionably correct - Macarthur, the commanding general in Korea and a towering World War II hero, publicly challenged Truman's authority and had to be removed. Most Americans rightly revere the principle that was at stake: civilian control over the military. But this situation is quite different."

    There was of course Gen. George McClellan vs. Lincoln; Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, who was fired for attacking President Jimmy Carter over Korea policy. But such challenges were rare enough and did not result in a revolt, now with seven already.

    The only two people in the government higher than the secretary of defense are the president and vice president who cannot be and the unspoken military code normally precludes direct public attacks on the commander in chief when troops are under fire.

    Clearly the retired generals surely spoke for many of their former colleagues, friends and subordinates who are still inside." In the tight world of senior active and retired generals, there is constant private dialogue. Recent retirees stay in close touch with old friends, who were often their subordinates; they help each other, they know what is going on and a conventional wisdom is formed."  Gen. Newbold," made this clear in an extraordinary, at times emotional piece, when he said he was writing "with the encouragement of some still in positions of military leadership." He went on to "challenge those still in uniform . . . to give voice to those who can't - or don't have the opportunity to - speak."

    The only two people in the government higher than the secretary of defense are the president and vice president who cannot be and the unspoken military code normally precludes direct public attacks on the commander in chief when troops are under fire.

    These generals are not doves or covert Democrats but professional career men, each with over 3 decades of experience, "who swore after Vietnam that, as Colin Powell wrote in his memoirs, "When our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons." Yet, as Gen. Newbold admits, it happened again. In the public comments of the retired generals one can hear a faint sense of guilt that, having been taught as young officers that the Vietnam-era generals failed to stand up to Defense Secretary   McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson, they did the same thing."

    Holbrook concluded that firing Rumsfeld is essential simply because for the past mistakes, "someone must be held accountable," although many others deeply involved in the mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan remain in power, and some are in uniform.

    "Put simply, the failed strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be fixed as long as Rumsfeld remains at the epicenter of the chain of command. Rumsfeld's famous "long screwdriver," with which he sometimes micromanages policy, now thwarts the top-to-bottom re-examination of strategy that is essential in both war zones.

    Richard Holbrook, former US ambassador to the United Nations
    Richard Holbrook, former US ambassador to the United Nations

    Lyndon Johnson understood this in 1968 when he eased another micromanaging secretary of defense, McNamara and replaced him with Clark M. Clifford. Within weeks, Clifford had revisited every aspect of policy and begun the long, painful process of unwinding the commitment. Today, those decisions are still the subject of intense dispute, and there are many differences between the two situations. But one thing was clear then and is clear today: Unless the secretary of defense is replaced, the policy will not and cannot change."

    White House support will not end the crisis as "more angry generals emerge - and they will - if some of them are on active duty, as seems probable; if the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan does not turn around (and there is little reason to think it will, alas), then this storm will continue until finally it consumes not only Donald Rumsfeld. The only question is: Will it come so late that there is no longer any hope of salvaging something in Iraq and Afghanistan?"

    Gen HR McMaster, a general serving in Iraq, in his 1997 book, Dereliction of Duty, argued that the joint chiefs of staff of the Vietnam era failed in their constitutional responsibility to object strenuously to misguided strategies.

    US Digging in

    But  US is digging in .Apart from construction of 4 bases in Iraq , a fortress-like new U.S. Embassy the size of Vatican City, 21 buildings on 104 acres ,the largest of its kind in the world, is  rising beside the Tigris River with its own defense force, self-contained power and water, at the heart of Iraq's turbulent red Zone . It will cost over $1 billion.



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